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REMOVAL OF THE IMPEDIMENT: THE STATE OF
TRANSGENDER MARRIAGE IN MONTANA
Wesley Parks*
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana has not addressed whether a marriage involving a transgender
person is legal, although the presence of the transgender community in re-
cent Montana news should signal this issue is on the horizon.1  The term
“transgender” is defined as “those [people] whose psychological self (“gen-
der identity”) differs from the social expectations for the physical sex.”2
The National Center for Transgender Equality estimates between 0.25 to
1.0 percent of the United States population identifies as transgender.3  Ap-
plying these nationwide estimates to the Montana population suggests ap-
proximately 2,500 to 10,000 transgender persons live in Montana.4  Mon-
tana will eventually have to address the issue of marriage among the trans-
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2013, The University of Montana School of Law.  I would like to
thank Professor Cynthia Ford who mentored me throughout the research and writing of this article and
who brought to my attention the statute that sparked my interest in this area of Montana law in the
Family Law course she taught during the spring semester of 2012.  In addition to Professor Ford, to
whom I owe an enormous amount of debt for guiding me through this process, I must also thank the
other individuals who took the time out of their extremely busy schedules to provide me with their
critical and insightful feedback, namely Lessie Brown, Stephanie Holstein, Rachel Parkin, Brooke Per-
kins, Nicole Pifari, Jonathan Proctor, Saille Simonetti, Paul Vestal, and the editorial staff of the Montana
Law Review.  Professor Eduardo Capulong additionally deserves recognition for introducing me to the
work of Dylan Vade.  Lastly, I must thank Rosalinda De La Luna-Long for her inspiration, support, and
encouragement.  This article benefitted greatly from these individuals.
1. See e.g. Keila Szpaller, Citing Restroom Safety, NotMyBathroom.com Opposes Missoula Anti-
Discrimination Ordinance, Missoulian, http://missoulian.com/news/local/citing-restroom-safety-notmy
bathroom-com-opposes-missoula-anti-discrimination-ordinance/article_2fd30e58-37ba-11df-abb6-001c
c4c002e0.html (May 25, 2010) (This article discusses the Missoula non-discrimination ordinance that
protects transgender persons from discrimination based on gender identity.  Opponents argued that wo-
men and children would be subject to increased sexual assaults as a result of allowing transgender
people into public restrooms that did not conform with their genitalia.). See also Gwen Florio, Trans-
gender UM Student Wins Restraining Order against Sexual Assault Suspect, Missoulian, http://missou-
lian.com/news/state-and-regional/transgender-um-student-wins-restraining-order-against-sexual-assault-
suspect/article_89aeefea-091e-11e2-843e-0019bb2963f4.html (Sept. 27, 2012).
2. Gender Equity Resource Center, Definition of Terms, http://geneq.berkeley.edu/lgbt_resources_
definiton_of_terms#transgender (accessed Mar. 21, 2012).
3. National Center for Transgender Equality, Understanding Transgender, http://transequality.org/
Resources/NCTE_UnderstandingTrans.pdf (May 2009).  Other groups have estimated the population to
be between 2.0 to 5.0 percent.  Transgender Law & Policy Institute, Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet,
http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf (accessed Mar. 21, 2013).  A precise num-
ber of persons who identify as transgender is unknown because the U.S. Census Bureau does not track
the population and many transgender persons are secretive about their identity.
4. This is only an estimate.  A definitive number of transgender persons in Montana has never
been confirmed.
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gender population.  Because current Montana matrimonial laws do not
address the transgender population, the Montana courts will likely deter-
mine the validity of transgender marriage.
Transgender people in Montana face the situation where they could be
legally recognized as one sex for some purposes and another sex for others.
For instance, Montana permits transgender persons to legally change driv-
ers’ license sex designations even if surgery has not been performed;5 on
the other hand, Montana only permits postoperative transgender persons to
legally change birth-assigned sex on birth certificates.6  Interestingly, in or-
der to obtain a marriage license in Montana, applicants can present either a
driver’s license or a birth certificate as identification.7  The question of
whether a transgender person is required to have surgery for his or her sex-
ual identity to be recognized for marriage purposes still remains.
Transgender persons struggling to have their self-identified sexes le-
gally recognized view amending birth certificates as fundamentally neces-
sary in order to ensure legal congruity with their self-identified sexes.8
However, most transgender persons do not undergo sex reassignment sur-
gery9 and are thus barred from changing birth certificate sex designations in
Montana.  A state employee in charge of amending sex designations on
Montana birth certificates has recently indicated that, to her knowledge in
the last two decades, approximately a dozen transgender persons in Mon-
tana have amended their birth certificates after undergoing sex reassignment
surgery.10  Consistent with nationwide findings, this evidence suggests the
vast majority of transgender persons living in Montana have not undergone
sex reassignment surgery.
5. Email from Patrick McJannet, Montana DOJ/MVD, CDL & Audit Section Supervisor (Jan. 10,
2013, 10:05 MST) (copy on file with author); see also State of Montana Motor Vehicle Division, Driver
Licensing Bureau Procedures Manual 300.6.1 (“Any individual who presents a letter from their physi-
cian stating that they are in the process of a gender change may have a driver license issued with the
proposed gender change (it will not be necessary for the individual to present a statement showing the
process is completed).”).
6. Admin. R. Mont. 37.8.311(5) (2012).  Montana requires “a certified copy of an order from a
court with appropriate jurisdiction indicating that the sex of an individual born in Montana has been
changed by surgical procedure.” Id.  Montana statutory and case law have not addressed whether
amended sex designations on birth certificates are valid for marriage purposes.
7. Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–203(1) (2011).
8. Jody Lynee Madeira, Law As a Reflection of Her/His-Story: Current Institutional Perceptions
of, and Possibilities for, Protecting Transsexuals’ Interests in Legal Determinations of Sex, 5 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 128, 145 (2002).
9. Deborah J. Anthony, Caught in the Middle: Transsexual Marriage and the Disconnect between
Sex and Legal Sex, 21 Tex. J. Women & L. 153, 186 (2012).
10. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Employee, Office of Vital Statistics, Helena, Montana
(Apr. 18, 2012).  The employee indicated that this is only an estimate from work experience and that the
exact number is not tracked.
2
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Montana’s constitutional and statutory laws prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage present barriers transgender people must overcome before their mar-
riages are legally recognized.11  Montana Code Annotated § 40–1–401 pro-
hibits specific types of marriages: marriages between already married per-
sons; marriages between certain blood relatives; and marriages between
persons of the same sex.12  The statute also provides that prohibited mar-
riages can be cured through “the removal of the impediment.”13  Although
marriages between blood relatives are incurable, marriages between already
married persons and between persons of the same sex can be cured.  An
already married person who marries another spouse can divorce one spouse.
Additionally, if traditional definitions of “sex” are used in the interpretation
of § 40–1–401, transgender persons can likely avoid Montana’s ban on
same-sex marriage through sex reassignment surgery or “the removal of the
impediment.”14  To illustrate, under current Montana law, a transgender-
identified female classified as male at birth who marries another male could
have this otherwise legally prohibited marriage recognized through sex re-
assignment surgery.  In this scenario, a transgender person in Montana who
has undergone sex reassignment surgery could argue that the legal barrier or
“impediment” prohibiting same-sex marriage has been removed.
Transgender persons who have not undergone sex reassignment sur-
gery should also be able to avoid Montana’s same-sex marriage ban be-
cause requiring a transgender person to undergo surgery in order to obtain a
legally recognized status violates both equal protection and privacy as guar-
anteed by the Montana Constitution.15  This article advocates for the adop-
tion of a principled, subjective definition of sex that respects the sexual
identity of transgender persons.  Montana should recognize a transgender
person’s self-identified sex rather than relying upon the flawed objective
model used by other states, which forces transgender persons to conform to
traditional notions of sex and gender.16  A legal definition of “sex” should
11. Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7; Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–401.
12. Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–401.
13. Id.
14. Currently, no Montana cases have been reported where a same-sex couple has attempted to gain
legal recognition of their marriage through this route.  Montana legislators vehemently against same-sex
marriage would likely want to tighten the current statute to foreclose this potential avenue.
15. See Anthony, supra n. 9, at 179–186.  Anthony argues that denying transgender persons the
right to marry violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment because it discriminates on the basis of sex.  Further, Anthony argues that federal due
process privacy protections are also violated when the government requires that genitalia match sexual
identity for marriage purposes.
16. The current DSM-IV uses the term “Gender Identity Disorder” when referring to transgender
persons.  American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 576
(4th ed., rev. 2000). The term “Gender Identity Disorder” is currently being reevaluated by the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association.  Gender Identity Disorder will likely be replaced in the DSM-V because the
term falls short of capturing the whole spectrum of gender variance.  Peggy Cohen-Kettenis &
3
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protect privacy, guarantee equal protection of the laws, and include all
transgender people within its meaning.17  Subjectively defining “sex” re-
spects an individual’s self-identified sexual identity and aligns the plurality
of gender expressions with the individual rights and freedoms protected by
the Montana Constitution.
As of the date of this article, no Montana court has explicitly addressed
transgender marriage.  Of the numerous state courts outside Montana that
have addressed transgender marriage, traditional, objective definitions of
sex were used that fail to protect the privacy of transgender people and fail
to apply laws equally throughout the entire transgender community.  This
article surveys in depth those out-of-state cases to illustrate the inconsistent
reasoning courts have applied when addressing transgender marriage.
Then, this article examines contemporary Montana cases regarding gay and
lesbian privacy and equal protection.  Synthesizing these sources, this arti-
cle suggests that Montana pioneer transgender marriage recognition through
the use of a subjective definition of sex and offers solutions for achieving
both legal marriage rights for the entire transgender community and social
acceptance of transgender persons.  Specifically, transgender persons must
be included in the struggle for gay and lesbian marriage equality, Montana
should adopt gender-neutral marriage legislation, and Montana should de-
fine sex subjectively.
II. A PLURALITY OF GENDER EXPRESSIONS
Montana case law problematically uses the terms “sex” and “gender”
interchangeably;18 however, this article takes the position that these terms
should remain distinct from one another.  Using the terms “sex” and “gen-
der” interchangeably supports the incorrect assumption that biological and
gender expression always align.  The term “sex” refers to an individual’s
biological sexual expression, while the term “gender” is much broader and
Friedemann Pfa¨fflin, The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents and
Adults, 39 Archives of Sexual Behavior 499 (2010).
17. See e.g. Anthony, supra n. 9, at 186.
18. See Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364, 368 (Mont. 2012) (“sex” and “gender” used interchange-
ably to refer to same-sex marriage); Baldridge v. Bd. of Trustees, Rosebud Co. Sch. Dist. No. 19, Col-
strip, Mont., 951 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Mont. 1997) (teacher’s comments about students’ testes and men-
strual cycles were inappropriate remarks based on “sex or gender”); Stringer-Altmaier v. Haffner, 138
P.3d 419, 423 (Mont. 2006) (sexual harassment does not occur when remarks are made regardless of
“gender” or “sex”); Williams v. Joe Lowther Ins. Agency, Inc., 177 P.3d 1018, 1023 (Mont. 2008)
(employer retaliatory threats because of refused sexual favors is harassment based on “gender or sex”);
Snetsinger v. Mont. U. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 466 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (laws or
policies “based on gender or sexual orientation are suspect classifications in their own right”); Stone v.
Belgrade Sch. Dist. No. 44, 703 P.2d 136, 141 (Mont. 1984) (employer can discriminate on basis of
gender when position requirements demand specific sex to perform job); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,
122 (1997) (homosexual activity referred to as “same-gender sexual conduct”).
4
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refers to the social and psychological expression of a person’s sexual iden-
tity.19  The terms “male” and “female” are typically used to describe a per-
son’s sex, while the terms “masculine” and “feminine” are typically used to
describe one’s gender.20  However, male/female and masculine/feminine
are binary opposites that do not encompass the multitude of sex and gender
expressions that fall somewhere within the spectrum of sex and gender ex-
pressions.21
A definition of sex inclusive of all transgender people should encom-
pass the sex and gender diversity that constitutes the entire transgender
community.  Gender expression within the transgender population is ex-
tremely varied, and “there is no prototypical transgender experience.”22  For
instance, some transgender individuals identify as the opposite biological
sex and are willing and able to undergo surgical procedures in order to
achieve that goal.  On the other hand, many transgender persons do not
want to surgically alter their bodies to change their physical appearance,
even though their biological sexes do not match their gender expressions.
Sexual orientation within the transgender community varies as much as it
does within the general population.  Transgender people identify as straight,
gay, bisexual, and queer.23  Some transgender persons are attracted to bio-
logical men, some are attracted to biological women, and some are attracted
to other transgender people.24  An objective, linear continuum from mascu-
line to feminine does not fully encompass the three-dimensional “gender
galaxy”25 comprised of countless combinations of gender expressions, iden-
tities, biological sexes, and orientations of varying degrees.  Defining sex
subjectively acknowledges individual sexual identity, encompasses the gen-
der diversity of the transgender community, and would assist transgender
people in gaining legal recognition of their marriages.
19. Amy Ballard, Sex Change: Changing the Face of Transgender Policy in the United States, 18
Cardozo J.L. & Gender 775, 779–780 (2012).
20. Id. at 779–780.
21. Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal Concep-
tualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 Mich. J. Gender & L. 253, 260
(2005).
22. Id. at 271.
23. A straight identification refers to being attracted to the opposite sex; a gay identification refers
to being attracted to the same sex; and a bisexual identification refers to being attracted to persons of the
same and opposite sex. See id. at 270–271.  The term “queer” is defined as a person who rejects hetero-
sexual social constructs.  “Queer” is often used to unite non-normative sexual communities against the
heterosexual majority for political purposes.  Frederick D. King, Queer Spaces and Strategic Social
Constructions in Rao’s The Boyfriend, 1 The Word Hoard 35, available at http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/word
hoard/vol1/iss1/5 (July 5, 2012).
24. Vade, supra n. 21, at 271.
25. Id. at 278.  Dylan Vade coined the term “gender galaxy.”  According to Vade, we need to
“work toward a world in which all people and all gender locations [in the gender galaxy] are supported,
recognized, and protected by the law.” Id.
5
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III. THE CURRENT STATE OF TRANSGENDER MARRIAGE IN MONTANA
Montana clearly bans marriage between two persons of the same sex.
The Montana Constitution, as amended in 2004, provides that “[o]nly a
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in this state.”26  The corresponding legislation appears as part of
§ 40–1–401, which provides that “a marriage between persons of the same
sex [is prohibited].”  Neither the Montana Constitution nor the legislation
defines the terms “man,” “woman,” or “sex,” apparently assuming that
every Montanan fits into an obvious category.  This assumption defies real-
ity and ignores the estimated 2,500 to 10,000 transgender persons currently
living within Montana.27  The Montana Supreme Court has addressed the
issue of same-sex marriage on three occasions, and none of those cases
involved transgender persons.28  Thus, the legality of transgender marriage
in Montana is unknown.
Montana law provides that same-sex marriages are illegal without giv-
ing any indication how same-sex marriage should apply to the transgender
community.  The absence of legislative and/or judicial definitions of what
constitutes a person’s “sex” for marriage purposes has left the transgender
community in Montana in legal limbo.  “Sex” for marriage purposes has
been defined in other jurisdictions in one of the following four ways: (1)
presence and functional ability of genitals; (2) birth certificate designation;
(3) physician designation given at birth; and (4) physical sex at the time of
marriage solemnization.29  All of these standards for defining sex for mar-
riage purposes have presented problems for the transgender community and
have been used inconsistently to invalidate the marriages of transgender
individuals.30  Although Montana law gives no guidance on how sex should
be defined in transgender marriage, § 40–1–401 provides a potential avenue
for transgender persons seeking to gain legal acceptance of prohibited
same-sex marriages.
Section 40–1–401 prohibits numerous types of marriages, such as
those entered between already married persons, blood relatives, and persons
of the same sex.  The most interesting aspect of § 40–1–401 is its second
subsection that legislatively approves a proscribed marriage once the basis
of the proscription—the so-called impediment—is eliminated.  Section
40–1–401 provides:
Prohibited marriages—contracts.
26. Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7.
27. National Center for Transgender Equality, supra n. 3.
28. See Donaldson, 292 P.3d 364; Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595 (Mont. 2009); Snetsinger, 104
P.3d 445.
29. Anthony, supra n. 9, at 174.
30. See Section IV infra.
6
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(1) The following marriages are prohibited:
(a) a marriage entered into prior to the dissolution of an earlier marriage
of one of the parties;
(b) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant or between a
brother and a sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the whole blood,
or between first cousins;
(c) a marriage between an uncle and a niece or between an aunt and a
nephew, whether the relationship is by the half or the whole blood;
(d) a marriage between persons of the same sex.
(2) Parties to a marriage prohibited under this section who cohabit after re-
moval of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of
the impediment.
(3) Children born of a prohibited marriage are legitimate.
(4) A contractual relationship entered into for the purpose of achieving a civil
relationship that is prohibited under subsection (1) is void as against public
policy.31
If a marriage is prohibited because both individuals are male and one
of them undergoes sex reassignment surgery and amends his birth certifi-
cate to become legally female, then the second subsection of the statute
would be satisfied, and the marriage arguably would be legally valid.  How-
ever, not all transgender people are willing or able to undergo sex reassign-
ment surgery.  A person born male recognized in the community as female
who lives her life as a female, but does not undergo surgery, would not
likely be able to gain legal recognition of her marriage to another male
under § 40–1–401.  Although this scenario has not presented itself in Mon-
tana courts, it appears that Montana law would require sex reassignment
surgery to avoid the same-sex marriage ban.32
Only recognizing a transgender person’s postoperative sex raises both
privacy and equal protection issues.  The state would infringe upon a trans-
gender person’s privacy rights by examining a person’s genitals, and the
state would violate equal protection by only recognizing a postoperative
transgender person’s sex while not recognizing the sex of a transgender
person who has not undergone surgery.  Sections 10 and 4 of Article II of
the Montana Constitution provide, respectively:
Right of privacy.
The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society
and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state inter-
est.33
Individual dignity.
The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws.  Neither the state nor any person, firm, corpora-
tion, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his
31. Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–401 (emphasis added).
32. See Admin. R. Mont. 37.8.311(5) (discussed supra n. 6).
33. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 (emphasis added).
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civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or
condition, or political or religious ideas.34
“Sex” is a complex concept, and Montana law does not acknowledge
this complexity.  A person’s sex is not composed of mere external biologi-
cal features.  The following eight factors have been shown to determine an
individual’s sex: (1) chromosomal sex; (2) gonadal sex; (3) internal mor-
phologic sex; (4) external morphologic sex; (5) hormonal sex; (6) pheno-
typic sex; (7) assigned sex and gender rearing; and (8) sexual identity.35
Sexual identity should be the dispositive factor in determining one’s legal
sex because state inquiries into the other factors infringe upon constitutional
rights.36  Defining “sex” subjectively would make sexual identity the dis-
positive factor.
IV. TRANSGENDER MARRIAGE OUTSIDE MONTANA
Because Montana courts have not yet addressed transgender marriage,
they are likely to look at precedent from other jurisdictions, but other juris-
dictions provide little useful guidance.  Marriage laws recognizing a trans-
gender person’s right to self-identify are virtually non-existent.37  Typically,
courts apply existing laws not created with transgender people in mind to
transgender marriage issues.38  Courts that have adjudicated transgender
marriage have failed to recognize the complexity of sex and gender by im-
posing a binary construct of sex—masculine/male and feminine/female—
upon transgender persons.  If all transgender persons are to be included
within the meaning of sex, Montana will have to define sex differently from
other jurisdictions.
Few states have adjudicated transgender marriage, and the courts that
have had the opportunity have applied shifting logic and reasoning.  Of the
following seven jurisdictions examined in this article, only one found trans-
34. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
35. Rachel Duffy Lorenz, Transgender Immigration: Legal Same-Sex Marriages and Their Impli-
cations for the Defense of Marriage Act, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 553 (2005) (arguing that birth sex should not
be dispositive but only one of the eight factors in determining an individual’s sex for legislative pur-
poses).
36. See e.g. Ballard, supra n. 19, at 799.
37. The word “virtually” is used here because nearly all gender-neutral statutory language drafted
for the benefit of same-sex couples is inclusive of transgender populations by default, except in New
York. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10–a discussed infra Part IV, Section C.  New York marriage laws recog-
nize a transgender person’s right to self-identify through mandates requiring gender-neutral legislation
and recognition of individuals who have been a “different sex.”  Thus, the New York statute contem-
plates the existence of the transgender community. See also Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8; Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. § 46b-20; Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 2-201(b); D.C. Code § 46-401(a); N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1-
a; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.04.020(3).  These statutes merely define marriage as between two people,
persons, or individuals.  They do not specifically address the transgender community.
38. Vade, supra n. 21, at 297.
8
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gender marriage legally valid.39  The other six jurisdictions have inconsis-
tently-reasoned decisions, but have all precluded transgender persons from
obtaining legally recognized marriages.40  This section first explores trans-
gender marriage cases from jurisdictions that currently have same-sex mar-
riage bans, followed by a discussion illustrating the problems applying the
logic of these jurisdictions to Montana.  Then, transgender marriage cases
from jurisdictions in which same-sex marriage or civil unions are currently
recognized are discussed, followed by a brief analysis of those jurisdictions.
A. Transgender Marriage in States with Same-Sex Marriage Bans
1. Kansas
Like Montana, the Kansas Constitution and statutes define marriage as
between one man and one woman.41  In In re Estate of Gardiner,42 J’Noel
Gardiner transitioned from male to female and amended her birth certificate
in the state of Wisconsin following the surgery.43  J’Noel had her driver’s
license, passport, and other official documents changed to reflect her sex as
female while living in Wisconsin.44  J’Noel later married Marshall Gar-
diner, a biological male, in Kansas.  At the time of their marriage, Marshall
was aware that J’Noel had changed her sex.  The following year, Marshall
suddenly passed away intestate.  Joe Gardiner, Marshall’s son, opposed
J’Noel’s interest in Marshall’s estate, claiming the marriage was a fraud
because J’Noel and Marshall were both men.45  The Kansas trial court de-
clined “to give full faith and credit to J’Noel’s Wisconsin birth certificate”
holding that Kansas did not have to recognize an amended birth certificate
from another state.46  The district court found in favor of Joe Gardiner.
J’Noel and Marshall’s marriage was ruled void as a matter of law because
39. See M. T. v. J. T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976) (discussed infra Part IV, Section
C).
40. See In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex.
App., San Antonio 1999); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 2004); In re
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987); In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221, 2003
WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11th Dist. Dec. 31, 2003); B v. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (discussed infra Part IV, Sections A
and C).
41. Kan. Const. art. XV, § 16 (“Marriage shall be constituted by one man and one woman only.”);
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23–2508 (2012) (“It is the strong public policy of this state only to recognize as valid
marriages from other states that are between a man and a woman.”); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23–2501 (Mar-
riage is “between two parties who are of opposite sex . . . [and] . . . [a]ll other marriages are declared to
be contrary to the public policy of this state and are void.”).
42. In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120.
43. Id. at 122–123.
44. Id. at 124.
45. Id. at 123.
46. Id.
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J’Noel was legally male.  Hence, J’Noel had no legal claims to her hus-
band’s estate.47
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the Kansas Leg-
islature did not intend to include transgender persons when drafting statutes
recognizing marriage as only between one male and one female.  The Court
interpreted “the legislative silence [in regards to transgender marriage] to
indicate that transsexuals are not included.”48  As such, if prohibitions
against same-sex marriage are ever lifted in Kansas, transgender persons
may nonetheless continue to be barred from marriage because they possess
no legal sex status for marriage purposes.
The Court held “the words ‘sex,’ ‘male,’ and ‘female’ in everyday
understanding do not encompass transsexuals.”49  It stated, “‘persons of the
opposite sex’ contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and
not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria.”50  The Court defined
male as “the sex that fertilizes the ovum and begets offspring” and female
as “the sex that produces ova and bears offspring.”51  The Court further
held that the male-to-female transgender individual is not female as a matter
of law because she lacks a “womb, cervix, [and] ovaries.”52  The Court
concluded, “J’Noel remains a transsexual, and a male for marriage pur-
poses” and upheld the lower court ruling voiding her marriage to Marshall
on the grounds that it was a same-sex marriage.53  In dicta, the Court essen-
tially barred postoperative transgender persons from marriage because they
lack a legal sex status and stripped them of a sexual identity for marriage
purposes.54
2. Texas
Texas, like Kansas and Montana, prohibits marriage between members
of the same sex in both its constitution and statutes.55  Texas courts, using
traditional definitions of sex, have determined that a person’s birth sex can
never be changed.  In Littleton v. Prange,56 Christie Cavazos, a male-to-
47. Id.
48. In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136.




53. Id. at 137.
54. In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136.
55. Tex. Const. art. I, § 32 (“Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and
one woman.”); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.204 (2011) (This statute also bans the recognition of any other
state’s legally recognized same-sex marriages and domestic partnerships.); Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 2.001 (This statute prohibits marriage licenses to be issued to persons of the same sex.).
56. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d 223.
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female transgender person, met and married Jonathon Littleton, a biological
male, in Kentucky in 1989.57  The couple moved to Texas, and in 1996,
Jonathon died while in the care of a physician.  Christie filed a medical
malpractice suit against the physician in Texas.  The trial court dismissed
Christie’s case on summary judgment because as a male, Christie could not
be the surviving spouse of another male and was not entitled to sue on
behalf of her dead husband.58  During the proceedings, Texas allowed
Christie to officially change the sex designation on her Texas birth certifi-
cate to female.59  The trial court that permitted the birth certificate change
considered the original birth certificate inaccurate as a result of the sex reas-
signment and permitted the change.  Yet, the Texas Court of Appeals inval-
idated the birth certificate sex change, finding that Christie’s original birth
certificate was not inaccurate at the time it was originally recorded.  Ac-
cording to the appellate court, the court that permitted the change was
merely performing ministerial duties and failed to consider “the deeper pub-
lic policy concerns presented” by permitting such a change.60  Thus, Chris-
tie’s marriage was found invalid, and her amended Texas birth certificate
was not binding on the appellate court for marriage purposes.  The court
reasoned, “There are some things we cannot will into being.  They just
are.”61
A person will always be his or her birth sex for marriage purposes
under the constraints of Texas law; sex is an immutable characteristic le-
gally unchangeable.62  The Texas Court of Appeals determined that a physi-
cian cannot change the “gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and coun-
seling.”63  The court stated, “as a matter of law . . . Christie Littleton is a
male.  As a male, Christie cannot be married to another male.”64  If birth
sex is unchangeable as the Texas court proclaimed, a postoperative male-to-
female transgender person could argue that her marriage to a biological
woman is valid even though same-sex marriage is prohibited in Texas.
Hence, the rule developed in Littleton arguably permits same-sex marriages
in such cases.  The court never considered that a postoperative transgender
person may identify as gay or lesbian and that its holding may lead to same-
57. Id. at 225.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 226.
60. Id. at 231.
61. Id.
62. Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
63. Id. at 224.  In its opinion the court uses the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably.  The
court also makes a point of noting that in referring to Christie as she, rather than he, they were only
respecting the wishes of Christie, and that there was no legal bearing on its use of the feminine pronoun.
64. Id. at 231.  The Texas court did not prohibit Christie from marrying a biological female.
11
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sex marriages between postoperative transgender persons and people of the
same biological sex.
3. Florida
Same-sex marriages and same-sex domestic partnerships are prohib-
ited in Florida statutes and the Florida Constitution.65  In Kantaras v.
Kantaras,66 Michael Kantaras, a female-to-male transgender person, mar-
ried Linda Kantaras after Michael underwent transition surgery.67
Michael’s transition-related medical procedures “included hormonal treat-
ments, a total hysterectomy, and a double mastectomy.”68  At the time of
their marriage, Linda was pregnant by a former boyfriend.  Michael adopted
Linda’s son.  In 1992, the couple had a daughter through artificial insemina-
tion, and Michael was named the father.69
In 1998, Michael filed for marriage dissolution and sought to obtain
custody of both children.  Linda argued that the marriage was void as a
matter of law because Florida prohibits same-sex marriage and also banned
same-sex adoption at that time.70  Although Michael technically still had a
vagina, a physician testified that medicine had enlarged and elongated
Michael’s clitoris and, as a result, Michael’s clitoris resembled a penis.71
During the dissolution proceeding, the trial court weighed the following
factors when determining Michael’s sex: (1) birth sex; (2) chromosomal
sex; (3) self-identity; (4) transition-related medical treatments; (5) spousal
knowledge of sex reassignment; (6) social holding out as self-identified sex;
and (7) legal modification of identification documents such as driver’s li-
censes, passports, and birth certificates.72  After weighing these factors, the
trial court concluded that Michael was legally male and entitled to primary
custody of the children.73
Despite the trial court’s careful consideration of a multitude of factors
in determining Michael’s sex for marriage purposes, the Florida District
Court of Appeals reversed.  The court held that a postoperative female-to-
male transgender person cannot marry a biologically-born female and any
such marriage is void as a matter of law.74  The court further noted that it
65. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.212 (2012); Fla. Const. art. I, § 27.
66. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155.
67. Id. at 155–156.
68. Id. at 155.
69. Id. at 156.
70. Id.; see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63.042 (held unconstitutional by Fla. Dept. of Children & Fami-
lies v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 2010)).
71. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 157.
72. Id. at 156.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 155.
12
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“must adhere to the common meaning of the statutory terms and invalidate
any marriage that is not between persons of the opposite sex determined by
their biological sex at birth.”75  After declaring the marriage between
Michael and Linda void, the court did not address the primary custody issue
and remanded the case to the trial court for that determination.76  The Flor-
ida Supreme Court upheld the appellate court and declared the marriage
void.77  Michael and Linda eventually settled their custody dispute in 2005,
with Michael obtaining joint custody of the children.78
4. Ohio
Same-sex marriages are not recognized in Ohio and have “no legal
force or effect.”79  Two lower Ohio courts have dealt with transgender mar-
riage issues, but the Ohio Supreme Court has yet to address transgender
marriage.  In In re Ladrach,80 Elaine Ladrach, a male-to-female transgender
person, married and divorced two women while a biological man, prior to
undergoing transition surgery.81  After undergoing her sex change, Elaine
attempted to marry a man and was denied a marriage license.  Elaine dis-
closed that she previously married two women on her marriage license ap-
plication.  She submitted a physician’s letter to the court confirming that a
sex change had been performed but to no avail.82  Elaine later attempted to
amend her birth certificate to show she was female, and the court denied her
petition, reasoning that the birth certificate was an historical record of
birth.83  The Ohio Probate Court, in a manner similar to the Texas Court of
Appeals, stated that Elaine was “correctly designated ‘Boy’ on his birth
certificate” and therefore could not “obtain a marriage license as a female
person.”84  The birth certificate, which could not be changed in Ohio, pro-
vided conclusive evidence that Elaine was a man.85
In a more recent case, an Ohio appellate court also addressed trans-
gender marriage.  In In re Marriage License for Nash,86 Jacob Benjamin
Nash was born Pamela Ann Nash.87  In 1999 while in Massachusetts,
75. Id. at 161.
76. Id.
77. Kantaras v. Kantaras, 898 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2005).
78. Chris Tisch, Transsexual, Ex-Wife Settle Custody Fight, St. Petersburg Times, http://www.sp
times.com/2005/06/11/Tampabay/Transsexual__ex_wife_.shtml (June 11, 2005).
79. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3101.01(C)(1) (2012); Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11.
80. In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828.
81. Id. at 829.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 831.
84. Id. at 832.
85. Id.
86. In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095.
87. Id. at *1.
13
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Pamela married and divorced a biological man before transitioning into Ja-
cob.  In 2002, while still living in Massachusetts, Jacob changed his birth
certificate to reflect his postoperative sex.88  Jacob moved to Ohio and ob-
tained an Ohio driver’s license designating Jacob as a male.89  Jacob then
met Erin Barr, a biological female, and applied for a marriage license.90
Jacob and Erin were denied their marriage license because “the court no-
ticed the previous court entry granting Nash’s name change from Pamela
Ann Nash to Jacob Nash.”91  The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the trial
court did not have to give full faith and credit to the out-of-state birth certif-
icate because “to do so would violate clear Ohio public policy.”92  Ohio
only permits the change of a sex designation on a birth certificate to correct
errors or mistakes made in the production of the original birth record.93
The court further noted, “Even if Ohio permitted changes to the sexual des-
ignation as noted on the original birth certificate, this would not affect the
clear public policy authorizing and recognizing only marriages between
members of the opposite sex.”94 Unlike the court in In re Ladrach, the
court here determined a birth certificate was not conclusive evidence of
one’s sex.95  Rather, in an effort to uphold public policy against same-sex
marriage, the In re Nash court would essentially permit same-sex marriage
between a postoperative transgender person and a person of the same bio-
logical sex.
5. Illinois
Montana Code Annotated § 40–1–401 and Illinois Compiled Statutes
Annotated 750 § 5/212 are strikingly similar.96  Like Montana, the Illinois
statute prohibits marriages between persons of the same sex.97  Further, just
like the Montana statute, the Illinois statute provides that “[p]arties to a
marriage prohibited . . . who cohabit after removal of the impediment are





92. In re Marriage License for Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *9.
93. Id. at *6.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832.
96. Compare Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–401 with Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 750 § 5/212 (2013).
97. Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 750 § 5/212(a)(5).
98. Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 750 § 5/212(b) (emphasis added).  Unlike Montana, Illinois does not have
a constitutional ban on same-sex marriages.
14
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similar to Montana, Illinois allows a transgender person to change his or her
birth certificate after sex reassignment surgery.99
In 2005, a transgender man in Illinois unsuccessfully argued the Illi-
nois “removal of the impediment” statute as the basis for the legal recogni-
tion of his marriage.  In In re Marriage of Simmons,100 Robert (born “Bes-
sie Cornelius Lewis”) and Jennifer Sterling were married in 1985.101  Dur-
ing their marriage, Robert and Jennifer had a child through artificial
insemination.  Robert had an outward appearance of a man, had lived as a
man for most of his life, and had taken testosterone for many years.  In
1991, Robert “underwent a total abdominal hysterectomy and a bilateral
salpingo-oophorectomy, which removed his uterus, fallopian tubes and ova-
ries.”102  In 1994, Robert changed his Illinois birth certificate to reflect his
postoperative sex using an affidavit signed by his surgeon stating a sex
reassignment surgery was performed.103
In 1998, Robert filed for dissolution of his marriage and for sole cus-
tody of his minor child.104  The trial court denied the petition for dissolution
finding the marriage was an invalid same-sex marriage.  Jennifer was given
sole custody of the child; Robert was deemed to lack parental standing to
pursue custody, although the court granted Robert visitation.105  Robert ar-
gued his marriage to Jennifer was valid since they “cohabited after removal
of the impediment.”106  Robert also contended his birth certificate was
proof that Illinois recognized his status as a male.  The appellate court,
however, determined his “‘impediment’ [had] never been removed because
while he [had] undergone surgeries to remove his internal female organs, he
still possesses all of his external female genitalia and requires additional
surgeries before sex reassignment can be considered completed.”107  The
court further held that “the mere issuance of a new birth certificate cannot,
legally speaking, make petitioner a male.”108  The court noted the State
Registrar would not have issued the new birth certificate if it knew that
Robert still had female genitalia.109  Robert’s marriage was invalidated, and
99. Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 410 § 535/17(d) (“An affidavit by a physician that he has performed an
operation on a person, and that by reason of the operation the sex designation on such person’s birth
record should be changed.  The State Registrar of Vital Records may make any investigation or require
any further information he deems necessary.”).
100. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 2005).





106. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d at 309.
107. Id. at 309 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 310.
109. Id.
15
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he lost standing as a parent because he was “not a man within the meaning
of the statute.”110
Robert failed to completely remove his impediment.  Although Robert
lost his case, the appellate court implicitly confirmed that the “removal of
the impediment” in a same-sex marriage can be achieved when a sex reas-
signment surgery is “considered completed.”111  The appellate court inti-
mated that a completed sex reassignment involves the surgical removal of
external genitalia.
B. Analysis of Jurisdictions with Same-Sex Marriage Bans
and Application to Montana
In jurisdictions where same-sex marriage is prohibited, “common
sense” or status quo definitions of sex have led to absurd court rulings that
make same-sex marriage a possibility when a transgender person is in-
volved.112  As the previous discussion displays, courts often use “common
sense” notions of sex and gender when adjudicating transgender marriage
issues, asserting that sex is immutable at birth and unchangeable.113  If a
state refuses to acknowledge a person’s sex transformation and binds both
parties to their birth sexes, the state may end up inadvertently allowing
same-sex marriages.  To illustrate, a person identified at birth as male who
self-identifies as female and lives as female could marry another female.
This marriage would remain legally valid in some states banning same-sex
marriage even if the person born male changed his sex to female via surgi-
cal means.
Although this author does not support same-sex marriage bans, Mon-
tana’s current ban on gay marriage could prove to be meaningless to post-
operative transgender persons if sex is not defined differently.  In the pres-
ence of similar statutory and constitutional constructs, Montana is poised
for a similar, nonsensical result as in Kansas, Texas, Ohio, and Florida.
Moreover, if Montana defines sex as immutable at birth, instead of defining
it subjectively, a postoperative transgender person could enter into a same-
sex marriage with a person possessing the same type of genitals, as long as
110. Id. at 312.
111. Id. at 309.
112. See Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 137; Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231; Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 155–156;
Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 832; Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 at *6, discussed supra.  In these cases, the
courts ruled that sex is immutable at birth.  An argument could be made that a transgender person who
has undergone a sex change can marry a person of the same sex because legally the couple would still be
the opposite sex, even though they have matching genitalia—one created surgically, the other created
biologically.
113. Jonathan L. Koenig, Distributive Consequences of the Medical Model, 46 Harv. Civ. Rights-
Civ. Liberties L. Rev. 619, 638 (2011).
16
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those genitals were not physician-created, while two persons with naturally
occurring matching genitals could not.
Defining sex as immutable at birth would conflict with Montana ad-
ministrative regulations and statutes that allow sex designations to be
amended.  Ohio and Texas do not permit an individual to change the sex
designation on his or her birth certificate after undergoing transition sur-
gery,114 but Montana does permit postoperative sex designation amend-
ments.115  The Montana Legislature gave the Montana Department of Pub-
lic Health and Human Services and the Office of Vital Statistics the admin-
istrative authority to amend birth certificates.116  However, the same statute
granting the administrative authority to amend birth certificates also gives
the judicial or administrative body “before whom the certificate is offered
as evidence” the authority to determine whether or not such amendment is
valid.117  Indeed, a Montana court could invalidate a birth certificate
amended after reassignment surgery and determine that sex is immutable at
birth for marriage purposes, while another court or administrative agency
could determine the amended birth certificate is valid for other uses, such as
for a driver’s license.118
Transgender people face the unique situation where they could be le-
gally recognized as one sex for some purposes and another sex for others.
For instance, not only does the Montana Department of Justice Motor Vehi-
cle Division acknowledge the sex designation on an amended birth certifi-
cate when issuing a driver’s license,119 the Division will also change a per-
son’s sex designation on a driver’s license if the applicant presents a physi-
cian’s letter with a proposed sex designation.120  In other words, sex
reassignment does not have to be complete for a driver’s license to reflect
the sexual identity of a transgender person.121  However, proof of a sex
114. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3705.15 (Only a name change is permitted for postoperative trans-
gender persons on Ohio birth certificates.); see also Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 191.028 (2011)
(A birth certificate can only be changed in Texas “to correct a record that is incomplete or proved by
satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate.”).
115. See Admin. R. Mont. 37.8.311(5).
116. Mont. Code Ann. § 50–15–204(2).
117. Mont. Code Ann. § 50–15–204(5).
118. Mont. Code Ann. § 61–5–111(2)(a)(iii) (requiring “the full legal name, date of birth, Montana
residence address unless the licensee requests use of the mailing address, and a brief description of the
licensee”).
119. Email from Patrick McJannet, Montana DOJ/MVD, CDL & Audit Section Supervisor (Jan. 10,
2013, 10:05 MST) (copy on file with the author).
120. Id.
121. Id.; see also Motor Vehicle Division, Driver Licensing Bureau Procedures Manual 300.6.1
(“Any individual who presents a letter from their physician stating that they are in the process of a
gender change may have a driver license issued with the proposed gender change (it will not be neces-
sary for the individual to present a statement showing the process is completed).”).
17
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reassignment is needed for a birth certificate amendment in Montana.122
Notably, however, in order to obtain a marriage license in Montana, appli-
cants can present either a driver’s license or a birth certificate to the clerk of
court.123  Thus, transgender persons can obtain a marriage license if a
driver’s license is shown as proof of identification regardless of sex reas-
signment surgery status.  Montana should not legally recognize a person’s
sexual identity for some reasons while refusing to recognize it for others.
Yet Montana would be doing just that if Montana determined sex is immu-
table at birth for marriage purposes.  Sex, in Montana, should be defined
subjectively to avoid these confusing and inconsistent results.
A rule recognizing only completed sex reassignment surgeries fails to
consider possible equal protection infringements.  Mandating genital re-
moval before validating a person’s legal marriage status unfairly targets
members of the transgender community who may not have the financial
means or desire to undergo the physician’s scalpel.  Recognizing a postop-
erative transgender person’s marriage while denying access to similarly sit-
uated transgender persons who have not had genital surgery denies equal
protection of the laws on the basis of sex, or the removal thereof.
The dicta in Gardiner essentially barred postoperative transsexuals
from marriage for lacking the required bodily organs.124  If Montana fol-
lowed the logic of the Kansas Supreme Court in Gardiner, the equal protec-
tion guarantees of the Montana Constitution would arguably be violated on
this basis.125  Using the logic applied by the Kansas Supreme Court, trans-
gender persons, sterile persons, and women who have had total hysterecto-
mies and oophorectomies (ovary removal) would all fail to meet the criteria
for sex necessary to enter into legally valid marriages.  Biological females
often have their ovaries, wombs, and cervixes surgically removed for a mul-
titude of medical reasons.126  Since the lack of legal sex status would seem-
122. Admin. R. Mont. 37.8.311(5).
123. Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–203.
124. In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 135.  The Kansas Supreme Court stated, “The words ‘sex,’
‘male,’ and ‘female’ in everyday understanding do not encompass transsexuals.  The plain, ordinary
meaning of ‘persons of the opposite sex’ contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and not
persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria.  A male-to-female post-operative transsexual does not
fit the definition of a female.  The male organs have been removed, but the ability to ‘produce ova and
bear offspring’ does not and never did exist.  There is no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any
change in his chromosomes.” Id.
125. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4. See also Kan. Const. Bill of Rts. §§ 1, 2.  The Kansas Constitution
also provides equal protection in its Bill of Rights; however, equal protection was not one of the issues
raised in Gardiner.
126. See Jon I. Einarsson & Yoko Suzuki, Total Laparoscopic Hysterectomy: 10 Steps toward a
Successful Procedure, 2 Reviews in Obstetrics & Gynecology 57, 57–58 (No. 1, 2009) (The authors
report that the removal of the cervix during a total hysterectomy is common.). See also Jerry L. Lowder
et al., Prophylactic Bilateral Oophorectomy or Removal of Remaining Ovary at the Time of Hysterec-
tomy in the United States, 1979–2004, 202 Am. J. of Obstetrics and Gynecology 538.e1 (Issue 6, June
18
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ingly apply only to transgender persons who have had their sex organs re-
moved, people who have had their sex organs removed for non-transition
purposes would still possess a legal sex status.  Using a subjective defini-
tion of sex would avoid this type of equal protection violation in Montana
because a subjective definition of sex recognizes an individual’s sexual
identity as valid, regardless of the presence, absence, or type of genitals the
person possesses.
Even though the Illinois and Montana statutes banning same-sex mar-
riage are similar,127 Montana should not follow Simmons because such an
approach would violate Montana’s constitutional right to privacy.  The Illi-
nois Constitution provides that “[e]very person shall find a certain remedy
in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation.”128  Illinois privacy protections are remedy-
based, whereas, in Montana, privacy infringements must withstand a strict
scrutiny analysis.  The Montana Constitution specifically states, “The right
of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”129
Montana’s privacy protections should require the state to show a compel-
ling state interest in order to examine the postoperative condition of a trans-
gender person’s genitals to ascertain completeness. A subjective definition
of sex would avoid privacy infringements by respecting a transgender per-
son’s sexual identity.  A subjective definition of sex would not require
transgender persons to undergo invasive surgical procedures or subject
them to state genital inspections.
C. Transgender Marriage in States Allowing Same-Sex
Marriages or Civil Unions
1. New York
In 2011, the New York Legislature lifted the ban on same-sex mar-
riage and simultaneously opened the door to transgender marriage by draft-
ing gender-neutral legislation inclusive of the transgender community.  The
New York marriage statute construing marriage relations in a gender-neu-
tral manner should be used as a model for Montana.  The current New York
statute provides:
Parties to a marriage
2010) (This article reports that approximately 3,686,000 hysterectomies with ovary removal were per-
formed in the United States from 1979 to 2004.).
127. Compare Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–401 with Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 750 § 5/212.
128. Ill. Const. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added).
129. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10 (emphasis added); see also Gryczan, 942 P.2d 112, discussed in detail
infra Part V, Section B.
19
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1. A marriage that is otherwise valid shall be valid regardless of whether the
parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.
2. No government treatment or legal status, effect, right, benefit, privilege,
protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether deriving from
statute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any
other source of law, shall differ based on the parties to the marriage
being or having been of the same sex rather than a different sex. When
necessary to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under
the law, all gender-specific language or terms shall be construed in a
gender-neutral manner in all such sources of law.130
The above statute followed two New York cases in the 1970s that de-
termined transgender marriage to be void as a matter of law.  The following
two New York cases examined in this article are important because they
illustrate how these courts wrongly focused on genitals in order to void the
marriages at issue when the courts could have easily based their decisions
on the well-established contract principles of fraud, mistake, deceit, and
non-disclosure.
In Anonymous v. Anonymous,131 a lower New York court voided a
marriage between a transgender woman and a biological male.  A non-com-
missioned Army officer met a woman on the streets in Augusta, Georgia, in
1968, and followed her into “a house of prostitution where they spent a
short time together.”132  In 1969, the two were married in Texas.  On the
night of the marriage, the husband “awoke at 2 o’clock in the morning,
reached for the defendant and upon touching the defendant, discovered that
the defendant had male sexual organs.”133  Upon the husband’s revelation,
the wife informed him that she planned on undergoing sex reassignment
surgery.  Soon thereafter, the Army sent the husband overseas, and while he
was gone the wife had the sex change as promised and sent her newlywed
husband the medical bills.  Upon his return from deployment, the husband
filed for a declaratory judgment in New York regarding the legal status of
his marriage after having to bail his wife out of jail on prostitution
charges.134  The New York court declared that marriages between two per-
sons of the same sex are invalid and that the “mere removal of the male
organs would not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female.”135
In Anonymous, the New York court, like Texas, Florida, and Ohio, deter-
mined that sex was immutable at birth to void the marriage, rather than
focusing on the fraud or misrepresentation that also made the marriage
voidable.
130. N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10–a (2013) (emphasis added).
131. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499.
132. Id. at 499.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 499–500.
135. Id. at 500.
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Similarly in B v. B,136 another New York court focused on the func-
tionality of sex organs rather than fraud or misrepresentation.  Mark B. (for-
merly “Marsha B.”), after having undergone a mastectomy and hysterec-
tomy as part of transition-related therapy in 1972, met and married Frances
B., a biological female.137  Two years later, Frances filed an annulment ac-
tion claiming that Mark was legally a woman and the marriage was a
fraud.138  Frances was unaware that Mark had previously been a woman
prior to the marriage, and she further claimed Mark was unable to have
“normal sexual intercourse” with her.139  Frances moved the court for a
physical examination of Mark.140  The court stated that “the marriage rela-
tionship exists with the result and for the purpose of begetting offspring.”141
Further, the court found Mark’s transition-related treatments did not make
him capable of taking on the male duties in the marriage relationship be-
cause medical science could not give him a penis capable of penetration.142
The court then denied the motion for a physical examination and annulled
the marriage between Mark and Frances.143  The court reasoned that “mar-
riage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman” and
medical science could not change a woman into a man.144  This New York
court held that a physician could not change a person’s birth sex, voiding
the marriage on the grounds that one’s sex is immutable at birth.145
2. New Jersey
New Jersey recognizes same-sex civil unions and grants same-sex
couples the same rights as married couples.146  In 1976, prior to the recog-
nition of same-sex civil unions in the state, a New Jersey court recognized
the marriage rights of a postoperative transgender person.  In M. T. v. J.
T.,147 M. T., a male-to-female transgender person, married J. T., a biologi-
cal male.148  M. T. and J. T. met when they were both physically men.  M.
T. went through years of psychological and medical treatment and transi-
tioned prior to marrying J. T.  J. T. supported M. T. through her transition
136. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712.
137. Id. at 715–716.
138. Id. at 713.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 714.
141. Id. at 717.
142. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 716–717.
145. Id.
146. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 37:1–28 (West 2013); N.J. Admin. Code 18:26–2.6 (West 2013).
147. M. T., 355 A.2d 204.
148. Id. at 205.
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process and even financed the treatment.149  Two years after M. T.’s sur-
gery, the couple ended their relationship.  M. T. petitioned the court for
maintenance, and J. T. claimed that the marriage was void because M. T.
had gone through sex reassignment.150  At the divorce proceeding, M. T.’s
doctor testified that the sex change aligned “[M. T.’s] sense of psyche gen-
der identity.”151  The court, like the doctor, reasoned that the transition sur-
gery harmonized M. T.’s gender with her genitalia.  This New Jersey court
held, “Plaintiff has become physically and psychologically unified and fully
capable of sexual activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes of
gender and anatomy.  Consequently, plaintiff should be considered a mem-
ber of the female sex for marital purposes.”152
D. Analysis of Jurisdictions Allowing Same-Sex Marriages or Civil
Unions and Application to Montana
Although New York currently allows both same-sex and transgender
marriage by statute, the marriages in Anonymous and B would still be void-
able153 in New York today under well-established contract principles.  To
focus on genitals and the evaluation of whether a person can perform sexu-
ally arguably violates individual privacy, especially under Montana’s con-
stitutional privacy mandate.  If Montana adopted a subjective definition of
sex, it would avoid this constitutional problem, and existing contract law
would serve to protect individuals who unintentionally enter into marriages
as a result of fraud or mistake.154 When same-sex marriage is legalized in
Montana, Montana should consider using the New York marriage statute as
a model for drafting gender-neutral marriage laws.  Until then, defining sex
subjectively will permit transgender persons to enter into legally valid mar-
riages under current Montana law, which bars same-sex marriage.155
Like New York, New Jersey has embraced same-sex marriage, and the
court in M. T. should be commended for recognizing a transgender person’s
postoperative sex and right to a valid marriage.  However, the court’s hold-
ing reinforces perceptions that transgender people suffer from a disorder156
that should be treated surgically.  The court stated, “In this case the
149. Id.
150. Id.  M. T. was able to change her birth certificate in New York to reflect her post-surgical sex.
151. Id. at 206.
152. Id. at 211.
153. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 7 (1981) (Contracts are voidable that are entered into
under fraud or mistake.).
154. See Beebe v. James, 8 P.2d 803, 806 (Mont. 1932) (In Montana, like in New York, contracts
“induced by fraud, false representations, deceit, [or] mistake” are voidable.).
155. Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7; Mont. Code Ann. § 40–1–401.
156. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
576 (4th ed., rev. 2000) (In the DSM-IV, the pathological factors that lead to a diagnosis of GID include:
22
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transsexual’s gender and genitalia are no longer discordant; they have been
harmonized through medical treatment.”157  This supports the misguided
opinion that transgender persons who undergo surgery deserve legal protec-
tion because they have the desire to conform to status quo definitions of sex
and gender.  As one author predicted, “Once it is in record that a person is
female because she has had genital surgery, it will be difficult for those
transgender people who have not had or cannot afford or never intend to
have genital surgery to have their genders recognized.”158  The holding in
M. T. perpetuates the perception that transgender persons who choose not to
undergo surgery are nonconforming gender fetishists undeserving of legal
protection. The court did not consider that not every transgender person can
afford, or desires, to undergo an invasive sex reassignment surgery.
V. EQUAL PROTECTION AND PRIVACY IN MONTANA
The Montana Constitution provides, “No person shall be denied the
equal protection of the laws . . . on account of . . . sex.”159  The Montana
Constitution also provides that “individual privacy . . . shall not be infringed
without the showing of a compelling state interest.”160  Montana courts
have considered the privacy and equal protection rights of the gay and les-
bian community in two recent cases, neither of which involved transgender
parties but may apply by analogy when arguing for transgender marriage
recognition.
A. Montana Equal Protection: Snetsinger v.
Montana University System
In 2004, the Montana Supreme Court adjudicated equal protection
guarantees for gays and lesbians as it pertains to employer-provided access
to health insurance benefits.  In Snetsinger v. Montana University Sys-
tem,161 the Montana University System (“University System”) denied
health insurance benefits to same-sex partners of employees but offered
health insurance benefits to opposite-sex partners of employees.162  Upon
signing a common law marriage verification form supplied by the Univer-
sity System, opposite-sex unmarried couples were able to purchase health
coverage for themselves and their children. The University System policy
(1) a persistent cross-gender identification, (2) discomfort about one’s assigned sex, (3) a lack of a
physical intersex condition, and (4) significant impairment in social functioning.).
157. M. T., 355 A.2d at 211.
158. Vade, supra n. 21, at 313.
159. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4 (emphasis added).
160. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
161. Snetsinger, 104 P.3d 445.
162. Id. at 448.
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did not allow same-sex couples to use the common law marriage form to
qualify for health benefits.163  The University System denied two of its em-
ployees, Carol Snetsinger and Carla Grayson, health care benefits for their
same-sex partners.  Snetsinger and Grayson sued, claiming that the denial
of health care benefits to their same-sex domestic partners violated the
equal protection rights guaranteed by Article II, section 4 of the Montana
Constitution.164
The Montana Supreme Court held that any employer “that adopts an
administrative procedure” to provide benefits to opposite-sex couples must
also offer those benefits to same-sex counterparts.165  The University Sys-
tem claimed that marriage was the determining factor in qualifying for
health benefits, even though the common law marriage affidavit form did
not fulfill common law marriage requirements.166  The Court held that de-
nying same-sex couples health care benefits while offering benefits to simi-
larly situated opposite-sex counterparts was discrimination based on sexual
orientation and violated the equal protection guarantees of the Montana
Constitution.167
Based on Snetsinger, Montana Code Annotated § 40–1–401 will likely
lead to equal protection violations if applied to transgender persons seeking
legal recognition of marriage.  In order to cure a prohibited marriage under
section 1 of § 40–1–401, section 2 requires the “removal of the impedi-
ment.”  For transgendered persons, this may require one person to undergo
transition surgery.  Requiring the “removal of the impediment” via genital
surgery prior to the legal recognition of marriage provides benefits to those
who can afford and want to undergo transition surgery while denying the
same benefits to similarly situated transgender persons who do not.  Mon-
tana law must treat similarly situated individuals in the same manner.168
Prohibiting transgender persons who have not had sex reassignment surgery
163. Id.
164. Id. at 448–449.  Snetsinger and Grayson also claimed violations in the right to privacy and the
right to pursue life’s basic needs guaranteed by Article II, sections 3 and 10 of the Montana Constitu-
tion.
165. Id. at 453.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 452.
168. Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 449 (citing McDermott v. Mont. Dept. of Corrections, 29 P.3d 992
(Mont. 2001)). See also Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 395 (Nelson, J., dissenting).  Justice Nelson noted the
following steps in determining whether a group is similarly situated: (1) identification of a State classifi-
cation of a group and identification of a group “roughly equivalent in all relevant respects besides the
classifying trait adopted by the State” to act as the control group in order to isolate the potential source
of discrimination; and (2) a comparison between the group classified by the State and the control group
to determine if there has been different treatment.  If the State-classified group is treated differently, the
court must determine whether the different treatment is justified under the specific level of constitutional
scrutiny. Id.
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 74 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol74/iss2/3
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\74-2\MON201.txt unknown Seq: 25 17-JUN-13 10:14
2013 THE STATE OF TRANSGENDER MARRIAGE IN MONTANA 333
from enjoying the benefits of marriage “denies, impairs, and disparages”169
the same rights enjoyed by opposite-sex married couples, whether or not the
opposite sex is achieved through surgical interventions.
So long as the law continues to classify individuals according to tradi-
tional definitions of sex, which “is just as invidious as maintaining regis-
tries of racial composition,”170 the transgender population is left in legal
limbo with no choice but to either conform to binary definitions of sex or
risk the possibility of not being legally recognized.171  However, trans-
gender individuals transcend traditional notions of sex and gender.  They
have been excluded from civil rights protections under the false belief that
“sex reassignment surgery renders a person neither male [n]or female.”172
Transgender persons deserve suspect class status that parallels the
heightened scrutiny analysis applied to laws that discriminate on the basis
of race because it is well-established that people who have endured a his-
tory of discrimination are deemed suspect classes, and laws affecting sus-
pect classes should receive heightened/strict scrutiny analysis.  Transgender
persons have historically been forced to conform to dominant, majority bi-
nary definitions of sex.173  Sex differences have traditionally passed equal
protection under intermediate scrutiny because courts have interpreted sex
and sex differences as inherent, natural, and either male or female.174
When intermediate scrutiny was created for discrimination based on sex,
transgender people were not contemplated.175  Montana should apply strict
scrutiny analysis when addressing equal protection claims involving dis-
criminatory practices against transgender people because of the history of
discrimination that the community has endured.176
169. Mont. Const. art. II, § 34 (“The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny, impair, or disparage others retained by the people.”).
170. Chinyere Ezie, Deconstructing the Body: Transgender and Intersex Identities and Sex Discrimi-
nation-The Need for Strict Scrutiny, 20 Colum. J. Gender & L. 141, 144 (2011).
171. See U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).  Footnote 4 states that
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”  This quote could not be more
applicable in regards to the increased protections that the transgender community deserves when adjudi-
cating their rights.
172. Ezie, supra n. 170, at 165; see also In re Est. of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 121, discussed supra Part
IV, Section A.
173. Ezie, supra n. 170, at 144.
174. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing that equal protection analysis in-
volving sex and gender differences must withstand intermediate scrutiny and “must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”).
175. Id. at 198–199.  The Craig Court contemplated “the difference between males and females with
respect to the purchase of 3.2% beer” when adopting the intermediate standard of scrutiny. Id.
176. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (transgender person terminated for
not conforming to sex and gender norms found to have been discriminated against on the basis of sex);
Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 2004) (firefighter terminated for being trans-
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Transgender discrimination has placed many members of the commu-
nity in the lower levels of the socioeconomic strata.  The disproportionate
poverty among the members of the transgender community directly affects
their access to health care and their ability to undergo transition-related
treatment, including hormone therapy, psychotherapy, electrolysis, voice
treatment, tracheal shaves, breast reduction or augmentation, and sex reas-
signment.177  In 2001, the average cost for genital sex reassignment alone
was estimated to be $15,000 or approximately $19,500 in 2012 (adjusted
for inflation using the Consumer Price Index increases between 2001 and
2012).178  Considering the average transgender person has an income below
the poverty line,179 limiting access to marriage to postoperative transgender
people benefits only the minority who have sufficient resources and un-
justly excludes the majority of transgender persons who lack the means to
obtain the surgery.
Montana should not use sex reassignment surgery as the litmus test for
determining transgender marriage rights.  Financially disadvantaged trans-
gender persons in Montana are already prohibited from using Medicaid
funds for sex-reassignment-related health care.180  Recognizing the mar-
riages of postoperative transgender persons while simultaneously denying
similarly situated transgender persons the same recognition violates Mon-
gender was discriminated against based on sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000) (pre-operative transgender male-to-female prisoner
who was sexually assaulted was found to have been a victim of a gender motivated act of violence);
Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821 (E.E.O.C., Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt (discrimination against a transgender per-
son in the workplace is discrimination based on sex and violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964).
177. See Pooja Gehi & Gabriel Arkles, Unraveling Injustice: Race and Class Impact of Medicaid
Exclusions of Transition-Related Health Care for Transgender People, 4 J. Natl. Sexuality Resource
Ctr. 7, 7–8 (No. 4 Dec. 2010).
178. Mary Ann Horton, The Cost of Transgender Health Benefits, Out & Equal Workplace Summit
Conference, 2–4, available at http://www.tgender.net/taw/thb/THBCost-OE2008.pdf (Sept. 2008).  In
2001, the cost varied from doctor to doctor and could range from $4,500 to $26,000 for male-to-female
surgeries and from $4,000 to $60,000 for female-to-male surgeries. Id.
179. Gehi & Arkles, supra n. 177, at 10.  Gehi and Arkles reviewed studies conducted in Washing-
ton D.C., San Francisco, and New York.  In 2000, a Washington D.C. study revealed that a shocking
29% of transgender survey participants had no source of income and 31% had an annual income of less
than $10,000, putting a staggering 60% of participants well below the poverty line.  In 2003, a study
conducted in San Francisco revealed that 64% of the population reported incomes under $25,000 per
year in a city where the average cost of living is nearly 85% higher than the national average.  In 2005,
the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, a New York non-profit organization that serves transgender people of
color regardless of income, found that 85% of its clients—who mostly reside in New York City—made
less than $9,570 per year. See also Emilia Lombardi, Varieties of Transgender/Transsexual Lives and
Their Relationship with Transphobia, 56(8) Journal of Homosexuality 977 (Oct. 2009). Lombardi notes
a 2009 study conducted in Pittsburgh of 90 transgender-identified individuals between the ages of 17
and 71 that found the majority earned less than $12,000 per year. Id. at 983.
180. Mont. Admin. R. 37.79.303(1)(q).  Included in this list of banned services in Montana are cos-
metic surgery, abortions, unnecessary medical treatments, and experimental treatments.
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tana’s express equal protection guarantees against discrimination on the ba-
sis of social class or condition.181  A subjective definition of sex that re-
spects a transgender person’s self-identified sex and gender avoids this con-
stitutional problem and would allow all transgender persons, regardless of
their financial means, the right to gain legal recognition of marriage.
B. Montana Privacy: Gryczan v. State and Armstrong v. State
Gryczan v. State182 addressed the right to privacy regarding same-sex
sexual relations in the home.  In Gryczan, three lesbian women and three
gay men filed a declaratory judgment action against the State, alleging that
Montana Code Annotated § 45–5–505,183 which criminalized same-sex
sexual conduct, was unconstitutional.  The plaintiffs claimed the statute vio-
lated both equal protection guaranteed by Article II, section 4 and the right
to privacy guaranteed by Article II, section 10 of the Montana Constitu-
tion.184
The Montana Supreme Court focused primarily on the privacy viola-
tions implicated by § 45–5–505.  In the Bill of Rights of the Montana Con-
stitution, privacy is considered a fundamental right.  As such, the Court
applied a strict scrutiny analysis stating that any infringement of privacy
“must be justified by a compelling state interest and must be narrowly tai-
lored to effectuate only that compelling interest.”185  The Court found no
compelling state interest justifying the infringement of privacy rights in
criminalizing same-sex sexual relations and deemed the statute unconstitu-
tional.186  The Court held, “[The] right of privacy under Article II, Section
10 of Montana’s Constitution includes the right to engage in consensual,
non-commercial, private, same-gender sexual conduct with other adults free
181. See Mont. Const. art. II, § 4 (The Montana Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination
based on “social origin or condition.”).  See also McClanathan v. Smith, 606 P.2d 507, 514 (Mont. 1980)
(social condition includes discrimination on the basis of economic status or rank).
182. Gryczan, 942 P.2d 112.
183. Mont. Code Ann. § 45–5–505(1) (“A person who knowingly engages in deviate sexual rela-
tions or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual relations commits the offense of deviate sexual
conduct.”); see also Mont. Code Ann. § 45–2–101(21) (“‘Deviate sexual relations’ means sexual con-
tact or sexual intercourse between two persons of the same sex or any form of sexual intercourse with an
animal.”).  Although the Montana Supreme Court decriminalized consensual same-sex sexual conduct in
1997, statutes that define deviate sex in this manner remained on the books until 2013. On April 10,
2013, the Montana Legislature finally passed Senate Bill 107, which revised the deviate sexual conduct
laws to strike the unconstitutional language regarding same-sex sexual conduct.  Mont. Sen. 107, 63d
Reg. Sess. (2013), available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2013/billpdf/SB0107.pdf.  In 2011, a similar
bill died in standing committee. See Mont. Sen. 276, 62d Reg. Sess. (2011), available at http://data.opi.
mt.gov/bills/2011/billhtml/SB0276.htm.
184. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 115–116.  The plaintiffs also asserted that the statute violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
185. Id. at 122.
186. Id. at 126.
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of governmental interference or regulation.”187  The Court further deter-
mined that every adult, regardless of sexual orientation, has a “reasonable
expectation that [his/her] sexual activities will remain personal and pri-
vate.”188
Montana privacy protections should also extend to the privacy of a
person’s genitalia.  Montana courts should not enter the business of examin-
ing a person’s genitals to see if gonads and gender expression synchronize.
Rather, sexual identity should be the only source of court inquiry in cases
where one’s sex is placed into issue.189  Once people accept that one’s anat-
omy is not necessarily dispositive of one’s sex, the significance of physical
sex is exposed as the “socially constructed and arbitrary classification” that
it really is.190  As such, defining sex by assessing genitalia ignores the fact
that people give significance to the objective and so-called immutable bio-
logical traits.191
If Montana courts interpret § 40–1–401 so that the “removal of the
impediment” incentivizes surgical procedures for transgender persons,
Montana should have to show a compelling state interest in order to in-
fringe upon the constitutionally protected privacy rights of transgender per-
sons.  The most typical “state interests” set forth in defense of legislation
that infringes upon the rights of transgender persons are: (1) prevention of
crime and fraud; (2) promotion of heterosexuality; and (3) enforcement of
gender norms.192  These arguments should fail to pass any compelling state
interest standard because they are based on unfounded biases and stereo-
types and are overbroad.  By defining sex subjectively, Montana would
likely adopt transgender-affirmative jurisprudence that moves toward the
deconstruction of laws that promote the dominant binary social norms and
embraces and acknowledges the plurality of gender expressions.193
187. Id. at 123.
188. Id. at 122.
189. Ezie, supra n. 170, at 180.
190. Id. at 198.
191. Id.
192. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (preoperative transgender
male-to-female bus driver fired for good cause because of legitimate concern over potential criminal
liability that may result from permitting a biological male to use women’s public restrooms); City of
Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ohio Mun. 1970) (Columbus ordinance prohibiting cross-
dressing in public determined to be substantially related to the “the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the public” and assisted in crime prevention); City of Chic. v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524
(Ill. 1978) (Chicago  asserted four reasons  for cross-dressing ban: “(1) to protect citizens from being
misled or defrauded; (2) to aid in the description and detection of criminals; (3) to prevent crimes in
washrooms; and (4) to prevent inherently antisocial conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of
our society.”).
193. Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender Formal
Equality, 23 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 83, 86 (2008).  Gilden argues that legal advocates for the
28
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After Gryczan, the Montana Supreme Court, in Armstrong v. State,194
further defined and expanded personal privacy and autonomy protections
guaranteed by the Montana Constitution.  The Court held the autonomy
component of Montana’s right to privacy protects an individual when mak-
ing medical decisions affecting one’s body.195  In Armstrong, a case that
dealt with the privacy rights of women choosing their own abortion pro-
vider, the Court expounded upon Montana’s heightened privacy protec-
tions:
Attempts to define this right notwithstanding, we conclude that, while it may
not be absolute, no final boundaries can be drawn around the personal auton-
omy component of the right of individual privacy.  It is, at one and the same
time, as narrow as is necessary to protect against a specific unlawful in-
fringement of individual dignity and personal autonomy by the government—
as in Gryczan—and as broad as are the State’s ever innovative attempts to
dictate in matters of conscience, to define individual values, and to condemn
those found to be socially repugnant or politically unpopular.196
As the above quote illustrates, Armstrong broadens the scope of Mon-
tana privacy protections.  Under Armstrong, denying marriage to trans-
gender persons is in itself an invasion of privacy, regardless of whether the
State forces a person to undergo surgery.  The invasion of personal auton-
omy through attempts to dictate matters of conscience is—in and of itself—
an invasion of privacy.  Thus, pathologizing a transgender person’s sexual
identity and requiring surgery infringes upon a transgender person’s privacy
throughout the entire continuum of privacy protection—from narrow State
genital invasions to broad matters of personal conscience. Denying trans-
gender people access to marriage because they fail to conform to status quo
definitions of sex further denies them privacy protections on the basis of
being “socially repugnant or politically unpopular.”197
C. Solutions Promoting Transgender Marriage Equality
Legal transgender victories tend to “perpetuate the underlying stigma-
tization of non-conformity to gender norms” rather than generate equality in
all forms of gender expression.198  However, a recent EEOC ruling indi-
transgender community should focus on the long term goal of liberating the transgender community
from the social confines of the binary social-sexual construct. Id.
194. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
195. Id. at 384.
196. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Gilden, supra n. 193, at 85.  Gilden argues the transgender community deserves sui generis
protections that acknowledge that transgender “discrimination stems precisely from a challenge to domi-
nate binary norms.” Id. Other cultures have embraced sex-gender expressions that fall outside the
definitions of male/female and masculine/feminine.  For example, the adoption of gender fluidity and
acceptance of gender non-conforming individuals was observed in some Native American populations
29
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cates that the attitudes toward transgender persons may be beginning to
shift in the right direction.  In Macy v. Holder,199 the EEOC recently held
that discrimination against transgender persons in employment violates Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The EEOC clarified that sex dis-
crimination under Title VII includes discrimination based on transgender
status.  “[I]ntentional discrimination against a transgender individual be-
cause that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination ‘based on
. . . sex,’ and such discrimination violated Title VII.”200  Although Macy
dealt with transgender employment discrimination, the EEOC ruling could
serve as an example to support an argument for access to marriage for all
transgender people.
Montana transgender legal advocates should challenge birth-assigned
sex rather than validating gender norms by attempting to assimilate trans-
gender individuals into the status quo.201  Anchoring transgender sex-stere-
otyping discrimination claims in mainstream gender behavioral characteris-
tics neutralizes the goal of “uproot[ing] sex and gender categories.”202  The
legal system should protect individuals who do not have the desire to con-
form to social-sexual expressive norms because as citizens, transgender
people deserve all legal protections afforded by the law.203  The following
solutions promote transgender marriage equality and should be considered:
(1) the inclusion of transgender persons in the struggle for gay and lesbian
marriage equality; (2) the adoption of gender-neutral marriage legislation;
and (3) the adoption of a subjective definition of sex.
1. Including Transgender Persons in the Struggle for Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Equality
There are no guarantees that the transgender community will have ac-
cess to gay and lesbian marriage, even if secured for the gay and lesbian
communities, because recent advances in gay and lesbian marriage equality
have been silent regarding transgender marriage rights.204  Considering
prior to colonialism.  Navajo society allowed children the autonomy to determine their own gender
identity.  Andrew Gilden, Preserving the Seeds of Gender Fluidity: Tribal Courts and the Berdache
Tradition, 13 Mich. J. Gender & L. 237, 237–240 (2007).  Contemporary American society, including
Montana, should adopt a similar social framework that expands gender norms to be inclusive of all
forms of gender expression.
199. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821 (E.E.O.C., Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.
eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt.
200. Id.
201. See Gilden, supra n. 193, at 92.
202. Id. at 95–96.
203. See id. at 98.
204. See Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub. nom Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012); see also Donaldson v. State, 292 P.3d 364.
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states like Kansas that have contemplated that postoperative transgender
persons do not possess a legal sex status for marriage purposes, same-sex
marriage mandates would still be meaningless to those who possess  no
legal sex.  As such, transgender persons must be included in cases seeking
gay and lesbian marriage equality.
Very recently in Perry v. Brown,205 the Ninth Circuit overturned as
unconstitutional a voter initiative amending the California Constitution de-
claring that only a marriage between a man and a woman is valid.206  The
California Supreme Court held the initiative unconstitutional because it
targeted a minority group and deprived its members of a fundamental
right.207 Perry fails to mention transgender marriage rights at all and explic-
itly names gays and lesbians as the targeted minority group,208 neglecting to
include transgender persons despite the commonalities that can be drawn
between the gay, lesbian, and transgender communities.  If cases like Perry
ever result in federal same-sex marriage recognition, transgender persons
may still not be afforded recognition of their marriages.  Although the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral arguments in
Perry in March of 2013,209 transgender people will likely not be included in
the Court’s final ruling because the transgender community was not in-
cluded in any of the lower court rulings.
Montana has also failed to address transgender marriage in gay and
lesbian marriage equality court rulings. Donaldson v. State,210 a recent
Montana Supreme Court case addressing gay and lesbian rights, like Perry,
did not specifically address transgender marriage rights.  In Donaldson, six
same-sex couples challenged the statutory structure of Montana laws that
deny same-sex couples the rights and privileges afforded to opposite-sex,
married couples.211  The couples complained that Montana’s statutory
structure violates their equal protection rights, privacy rights, dignity, pur-
suit of life’s basic necessities, and due process.212  The couples—none of
whom were transgender—sought declaratory and injunctive relief.213  The
Montana Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were precluded from relief
because they failed to specifically identify the statutes that violated their
constitutional rights.214
205. Perry, 671 F.3d 1052.
206. Id. at 1064.
207. Id. at 1066.
208. Id. at 1082.
209. The United States Supreme Court is expected to rule on this case in June of 2013.
210. Donaldson, 292 P.3d 364.
211. Id. at 365.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 366.
214. Id. at 367.
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The Court remanded the case, giving the plaintiffs an opportunity to
amend the complaint and identify specific statutes and the constitutional
scrutiny that should be applied to each challenged statute.215  Even though
transgender persons were not included as plaintiffs in Donaldson, Montana
Code Annotated § 40–1–401 is a specific statute that gays, lesbians, and
transgender persons should challenge together.  Hopefully, transgender
persons will be included as plaintiffs in future challenges to the constitu-
tional validity of § 40–1–401.  Although the majority opinion in Donaldson
failed to mention the transgender community, Justice Nelson, in his in-
sightfully written dissent, did not:
The committed couples here—and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
Montanans everywhere—must never lose sight of the fact that although to-
day’s battle has been lost, the war has not been. They must remain united in
defeat because, in the end, they will overcome; they will prevail.  Of that, I am
absolutely certain.216
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons should remain united; let’s
not forget transgender people in the fight for marriage equality.
2. Gender-Neutral Marriage Legislation
Montana should adopt gender-neutral marriage language when the
marriage statutes are eventually rewritten.  The New York marriage statute
construing marriage relations in a gender-neutral manner should be used as
a model for Montana when the prohibitions against same-sex marriage are
lifted and new legislation is drafted to replace the archaic marriage laws in
Montana recognizing only those marriages between opposite sexes.  Today
in New York, two individuals can marry regardless of “being or having
been of the same sex rather than a different sex.”217  The New York statute
further states that “all gender-specific language or terms shall be construed
in a gender-neutral manner in all such sources of law.”218  The language in
this New York legislation clearly recognizes the existence of transgender
persons and legally validates any marriage entered into by a transgender
person in New York.  New York provides an ideal model for Montana
when current constitutional and statutory laws banning same-sex marriage
are overturned.
215. Id.
216. Donaldson, 292 P.3d at 423 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (first and second emphases added, third and
fourth emphases as in original).
217. N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 10–a(2) (emphasis added).
218. Id.
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3. A Subjective Definition of Sex
Although lifting Montana’s constitutional same-sex marriage ban and
adopting gender-neutral marriage legislation is the most ideal solution, de-
fining sex subjectively would be a step in the right direction for transgender
persons.  Defining sex subjectively would not implicate a necessity for tran-
sition-related surgery in the interpretation of Montana Code Annotated
§ 40–1–401.  Defining sex subjectively would avoid violations of privacy
and violations of equal protection.  Section 40–1–401 could be redrafted to
resemble the following:
Prohibited marriages—contracts.
(1) The following marriages are prohibited:
. . .
(d) a marriage between persons of the same sex*.
(2) Parties to a marriage prohibited under this section who cohabit after re-
moval of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of
the impediment.
* ‘Sex’ as defined in this statute refers to a person’s subjective, self-identi-
fied sex.  Sex shall not be determined by the sex of the individual assigned at
birth, gender rearing, or objective gender manifestations.
A subjective definition of sex respects an individual’s self-identified
sex and gender identity.  A subjective definition of sex would not require
Montana to amend its constitution or completely rewrite its marriage stat-
utes.  Defining sex subjectively would continue to protect transgender per-
sons even when same-sex marriage prohibitions are lifted in Montana.  Fur-
ther, a subjective definition of sex would align gender expression with the
individual rights and freedoms protected in the Montana Constitution.  If
sex were defined subjectively, the “removal of the impediment” would not
be interpreted as requiring transgender persons to surgically alter their bod-
ies.  Most importantly, a subjective definition of sex would assist in paving
the way to the social acceptance of the transgender community.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prohibitions against same-sex marriage present the greatest legal bar-
rier for transgender people attempting to enter into marriage because sex
has not been legally defined to be inclusive of the transgender population.
Montana Code Annotated § 40–1–401 suggests that a same-sex marriage
can be legalized through the “removal of the impediment.”  Using tradi-
tional, objective definitions of sex, the “removal of the impediment” can
arguably be interpreted as incentivizing surgical procedures for transgender
persons in relationships with persons who have matching genitals and dif-
ferent sexual identities.  Requiring sex reassignment surgery in order for
transgender people to gain legal recognition of marriage would violate the
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privacy and equal protection guarantees of the Montana Constitution.  Ac-
cessing the fundamental right of marriage should not require anyone to un-
dergo surgery.  A subjective definition of sex recognizes the plurality of
gender expressions, provides privacy protections, guarantees equal protec-
tion of the laws, and includes all transgender people within its meaning
regardless of whether sex reassignment surgery has been performed.
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